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12.  21ST Century Peacekeeping and Future Warfare  
Efrat Elron 
 
The UN was designed not to bring humanity to heaven but to save it from hell. 
Dag Hammarskjöld 
 
There is a vast, sensible middle ground between those who see the United Nations as 
the only hope for the world and those who see in it the end of the world. 
Madeleine Albright 
 
In an interdependent and interconnected world values can represent interests. The 
reality is that they are not polar opposites. We have an interest in peace process and 
it is in our interest, but it will not succeed in assisting if its not based on values. 
Helping people is a moral cause but also in our long term interest, otherwise we will 
find that part of the world is turned against us. And problems never stay fixed in one 
part of the world … . 
Tony Blair (Jerusalem, 2011) 
 
Two distinct worlds of international security have emerged in the post-Cold War era: that of US 
power and that of international institutions. It is “a story about the changing nature of power, and of 
careful adaptation and surprising innovation in international governance” (Jones, Forman, & 
Gowan, 2010). Conflict and cooperation among states on matters of peace and security have been 
increasingly managed, regulated, or implemented by and through multilateral security institutions. 
The most visible manifestation of this evolution in the practice and form of international politics has 
been the vast expansion of the work of the UN Security Council; the enormous expansion of tools 
such as international mediation, peacekeeping, and post conflict operations to manage civil wars; the 
proliferation of new instruments for tackling conflict and security challenges; and new mandates for 
older institutions to adapt themselves to changing security realities (Jones, Forman, & Gowan, 
2010).  
While different in their responses, peace and stability operations are embedded in similar 
environments and face some similar difficulties. The majority of UN peace operations are embedded 
in complex intrastate conflicts, corresponding with terms such as “wars amongst people” and 
“irregular warfare” (the latter rarely used by the UN stakeholders). These deployments, then, face 
warfare that is non-linear, complex, and about “winning hearts and minds,” Hence, a significant part 
of their role is to create conditions for political solutions, on the one hand, while putting an 
emphasis on force protection and not only mission accomplishment, on the other (Dandeker, 2009). 
In possible future scenarios, the US will benefit from a deeper knowledge of the parallel world of 
international institutions and their efforts at keeping and making global security and peace.  
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This paper will focus on peacekeeping operations as a form of intervention by the international 
community over the next 15 years. Like it or not, it may fall to the United Nations and the 
international community to keep the international system from descending into more generalized 
armed conflict. This presents an initial overview of recent of peacekeeping and peace operations, 
areas in which militaries from around the world play a crucial role. It will conclude with 
recommendations for US policy makers on how to better understand, cooperate, and enhance these 
tools, making the two worlds of international security less separate, arguing that they are mutually 
dependent for better managing the transition from warfare and conflict to stability and peace.  
 
Recent UN peacekeeping initiatives  
The first months of 2011 brought with them several momentous events that signify possible 
important trends in multilateral peacekeeping-related efforts. Notable are the new interim peace 
operation in Sudan’s Abyei region, military intervention in Libya, and the peace operation in South 
Sudan. All involve the UN as well as other global and regional organizations trying to develop 
innovative solutions to reduce the threat of conflict to civilians. The multilateral efforts to assist 
Haiti after the 2010 earthquake is a lesson learned in the success of new strategies of US military 
cooperation with a UN peacekeeping force as well as a multitude of partners on the ground. Reading 
into these seemingly separate events is a valuable way to understand the most recent thinking, doing, 
and un-doing of multilateral institutions in their efforts to enhance global security, to estimate the 
main trends related to their future participation in warfare, and to assess the US ability to best 
partner with peacekeeping operations and the organizations responsible for them.  
On June 27, 2011, a novel and temporary conflict-management mechanism was set in place for the 
Sudanese Abyei region, combining national, regional, and global initiatives and capabilities. The UN 
Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved a US-drafted resolution authorizing the 
deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian troops to this disputed hotspot for a six-month period. The 
resolution establishes a new UN peacekeeping force—the United Nations Interim Security Force for 
Abyei, or UNISFA. Abyei has been the scene of heavy fighting, forcing tens of thousands of people 
from their homes in the weeks preceding the June 19, 2011, agreement between the two sides on the 
need for a third party to monitor the area as they pull out their forces. The agreement was mediated 
by Thabo Mbeki, the former South African president, and overseen by the African Union (AU). 
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC authorized UNISFA, within its 
capabilities and its area of deployment, to take the necessary actions to protect civilians in the Abyei 
area who are under imminent threat of physical violence. It also authorized the use of force to 
protect the area “from incursions by unauthorized elements,” as defined in the agreement between 
the parties. The resolution further charged the interim force with facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and the free movement of relief workers in and around Abyei. When necessary, 
and in coordination with the Abyei Police Service, UNISFA troops were also asked to provide 
security for the region’s oil infrastructure. 
While usually it takes at least three months for UN peacekeepers to deploy, an advance force of 
some 1,300 Ethiopian troops were expected to be on the ground in Abyei before July 9, 2011, the 
day South Sudan received its independence through secession from Sudan. An issue for the Security 
Council will be how the precedent of establishing a peacekeeping mission around a sole troop 
contributor from a neighboring state may affect command and control and leadership requirements 
and, in the future, the relationship between peacekeeping operations and host governments in other 
situations. While South Sudan’s situation is unique, it has been the way the African Union has 
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chosen to guide the process. (Security Council Report, Update Report No. 3 on Sudan, 17 June 
2011). 
Three months earlier, on March 17, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) on the 
response to the events in Libya. It was the first time that the term Protection of Civilians (PoC) was 
used as the primary stated objective in a non-consensual intervention, rather than its previous use 
for consent-based peacekeeping missions. The resolution authorized Member States “to take all 
necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory….” Two days later, 
a coalition including the United States commenced attacks via aircraft and missiles on Libyan 
military targets. The US-led attack was later transferred to NATO Command, continuing with 
Operation Unified Protector.  
A day before, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his deep worries about the Alliance’s 
will and capabilities (Gates, 2011), noting NATO members' widespread refusal or inability to 
participate in actual strike missions and difficulties in sustaining intense operations—a reminder of 
what the world's most powerful military alliance cannot accomplish (Haas, 2011). US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton took part in the third meeting of the international Contact Group on Libya 
held in Abu Dhabi. The group, seeking a resolution to the conflict through a variety of means, 
included foreign ministers from 22 countries and six international organizations, including the 
unique combination of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, UN, African Union, European Union, and NATO. In this unique and novel coalition, 
the group pledged to support a new funding mechanism set up in May.1 
In the third case of multinational cooperation in the face of a crisis is the aftermath of the 
earthquake in Haiti in early 2010. The humanitarian response effort included a unique partnership 
between the US military, Haitian government, UN, and members of the NGO community. 
SOUTHCOM established Headquarters, Joint Task Force (JTF), to conduct humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief operations. As a few examples of collaborative work, US senior planners and 
leaders worked alongside their counterparts to develop detailed plans for moving internally displaced 
persons who were in danger, while engineers worked with the UN’s Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) to identify camps in Port-au-Prince that were in direct danger of flooding and mud 
slides. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell facilitated this essential and early 
coordination and collaboration, interfacing with every facet of the joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational environment to ensure synchronization, which greatly helped 
identify and minimize duplication of effort and other inefficiencies. Many lives in Haiti would have 
been lost if not for Operation Unified Response and the access NGOs had to DoD information and 
vice versa, as well as the joint use of online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, to 
disseminate information and correct misinformation quickly (United States Southern Command, 
2010; Sodberg, 2011). 
In the meantime, discussions and planning are taking place in the UN headquarters in New York on 
establishing a new mission to replace the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), 
the current UN mission that has been monitoring the peace agreement between North and South 
Sudan since 2005 and which was terminated July 9, 2011. UNMISS is likely to have a military 
component of 5,000 personnel and a police component of around 900 officers. Its mandate will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Online at http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/pr-2011/secretary-clinton-at-the-libya-contact-group-meeting/secretary-
clinton-at-the-libya-contact-group-meeting.html 
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soon be determined. At present, UNMISS staff are being screened for deployment in the new 
mission, yet again an innovative practice. Hopefully, this new peace operation, deployed in the newly 
independent South Sudan within a fragile political situation—which poses a possible threat to 
international peace and security and faces a government that will most probably not be able to 
protect civilians—will be appropriate to the threats presented and will embody a multidimensional 
peace operation with emphasis on PoC, Chapter VII, robust military and police 
components, effective leadership, and a sound and detailed strategy and campaign plan (Giffen, 
2011; personal conversation, Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in South 
Sudan, June 26).   
These recent events are important in that they may signify the dawn of a new era in the international 
community’s attempts to regulate and control warfare around the globe. As the United States and its 
NATO partners retreat from their collective deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq, the international 
community faces the prospect of even more active involvement in addressing the consequences of 
persistent warfare around the world without the states best equipped to intervene militarily around 
the world, e.g., UK, Canada, and Australia. The ability of the international community to muster the 
resources and political will to address this issue will have profound consequences for the nature of 
warfare around world over the next quarter century.   
These three seemingly separate conflicts and UN initiatives serve as an indication of the current and 
future trends and changes multilateral organizations like the UN and NATO are going through, as 
well as the possibilities and challenges they present for US policymakers in their thinking on how to 
best enhance national and global security. These trends include UNSC resolutions that are fine-
tuned to adjust to new situations and allow a variety of uses of force, an emphasis on the protection 
of civilians, policymaking and defense budget cuts directed toward the limiting of military 
capabilities in a multitude of countries, different and sometimes innovative formats of peace 
operations to allow greater effectiveness in urgent situations, an emphasis on partnerships with a 
wider variety of government and nongovernment partners with crossing of organizational 
boundaries, and creating flexible forms to facilitate these partnerships. If the US, the UN, and their 
various partners can consolidate and capitalize upon these trends, it may suggest that the 
international community as a whole may be able to more effectively regulate armed conflict. 
As the United States retreats from Afghanistan and Iraq, it may inevitably find itself participating in 
new multilateral mechanisms if it wishes to remain part of the “global police force.” Yet, for all its 
unrivaled power and direct or indirect involvement in the four conflicts described above, e.g., as a 
permanent security council member, the United States is a limited partner in the shaping of the 
evolution of this new multilateral security architecture. While influential in some areas and decisive 
in others, the United States has allowed others to drive some of the significant evolutions that have 
occurred. This is mostly true in the areas of “soft” security threats, largely related to internal conflict 
and humanitarian crisis (Jones, Forman & Gowan, 2010). The Pentagon has recently identified 
peacekeeping as an essential and high priority area for needed investment, yet US roles remain 
limited. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights peacekeeping capabilities through a 
commitment to assist “partners in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to 
improve their security capacity . . . [and enhancing] US capabilities to train, advise, and assist 
partner-nation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations.” Moreover, 
since taking office, the Obama administration has paid off peacekeeping arrears accumulated over 
the previous four years. In 2009, the United States also provided more than $600 million in training, 
equipment, and logistics assistance to 55 nations to help bolster their capacity to contribute troops 
and police for peacekeeping operations. Dr. Susan Rice, an African expert, was made US 
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Ambassador to the UN and a member of Obama's Cabinet, a first for a UN Ambassador (Sodberg, 
2011). 
 
Trends in UN peacekeeping 
Over the past two decades the UN has evolved into the principal instrument for the management of 
armed conflict. Deployment of personnel in 2011 peace operations of the UN and African Union 
(AU) surpassed record levels, with over 200,000 military, police, and civilian personnel operating in 
16 missions in the field over the year (Annual Review of Peace Operations, 2011). Military troops 
from 114 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are the backbone of these operations. The five 
largest missions, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Timor-Leste, Lebanon, Liberia, and 
Sudan, account for 77 percent of total UN troop deployments. Additional forces to Sudan, Côte 
d'Ivoire, and Somalia reflected continuing demand for UN and regional peacekeeping arrangements. 
Overall, the expansion of peacekeeping operations over the last decade is a five-fold increase. At the 
same time, the rate of UN increase slowed significantly due to phased drawdown in stable 
environments, as well as diminishing and, in some cases, denial of national consent for operations, 
resulting in mission closure or downsizing, e.g., Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast. 
In order to perform their core functions, the significant quantitative increase in UN peacekeeping 
missions in the last decade is intertwined with the transformation of their qualitative profile, which 
can be detected in their expanded mission spectrum. Although there are continuous widespread 
debates regarding the nature and responsibility of peace missions operating under the UN (for a 
review see Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin 2004, and Hebeger 2007), on the ground these operations 
extend far beyond the monitoring and verification tasks of their predecessors, and their mandates 
are expanding on multiple horizons. 
The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers are increasingly charged with nation-
building tasks, such as economic rehabilitation, democratization, building civil institutions and 
working police forces, humanitarian aid, and repatriation of refugees. Since 2003, UN peacekeepers 
have deployed to no fewer than eight complex “multidimensional operations.” 
In order to help peacekeeping missions focus on their most essential goals, the 2008 Capstone 
Doctrine (officially titled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines) 
identified their core functions: “Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the 
State’s ability to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; facilitate the 
political process by promoting dialogue and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective 
institutions of governance; provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international 
actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.” These core 
functions reflect some of the major trends in peacekeeping mirroring the trends in modern warfare, 
including a shift from dealing with interstate to intrastate conflicts and, hence, coping with whole 
states via complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex 
mandates, as well as being embedded in zones where irregular warfare is abundant. 
These shifts are accompanied by the changed emphasis from UN Charter Chapter VI to Chapter 
VII—from observing and monitoring the end of conflicts to actively protecting civilians caught in 
them. Beginning in 1999 with UNSCR 1270 regarding the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), PoC mandates have routinely been included in UN resolutions and typically authorize 
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peacekeeping forces to protect civilians from imminent violence within UN-force areas and 
capabilities. At the same time, the UN has yet to clarify what is meant by expressions such as 
“imminent violence,” “all necessary means,” or “prejudice to the responsibilities” and more specific 
guidelines as well as oversight mechanisms are still missing, partially because of national interests 
regarding its actual implementation (Security Council Report on the Protection of Civilians, 2011; 
Dwight, 2011). Agreement is needed as to how far these mandates should go and how compelling 
they are to peacekeepers. 
Multidimensional peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve 
conflict, because they have a high degree of international legitimacy and because the representation 
of the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the 
conflicting parties. They are also being deployed in settings considered less and less ripe for conflict 
resolution, where the state’s capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order 
is often weak and political violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic 
infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed in many of these situations while large sections of the 
population may have been displaced. Society may have divided along ethnic, religious, or regional 
lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further 
complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation. 
Although longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts are normally the work of 
development actors such as the UN, they also involve partners outside the UN that have the 
resources and technical expertise required to effectively undertake such missions. Experience has 
shown that in the short-term UN peacekeeping operations may have little choice but to initiate 
longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts, due to the inability of other actors to take the 
lead. Moreover, in the past few years, peace operations were also involved in dealing with growing 
transnational risks such as organized crime, as well as with assistance with security-sector issues and 
preventive action. Where no effective local police capacity exists, UN police (UNPOL) have 
assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. Across all missions, they play diverse 
and critical roles in the effort to (re)establish the rule of law. 
 
Challenges for the UN and possibilities for the US 
UN peacekeeping has many shortcomings in implementing the complex tasks it is mandated to 
perform. This section is not meant to berate the existing state of play, but to point out further 
opportunities where the US may enhance the capabilities of this parallel and intertwined universe. A 
broad overview reveals that, despite overall growth and demand in deployment numbers, 
peacekeeping continues to suffer from political and operational challenges: overstretched resources, 
weak or nonexistent peace agreements, and minimal or absent consent by some of the states in 
which it is deployed. Political violence in some theaters still overwhelmingly targets civilian 
populations as well as peacekeepers under many of the classic tenets of irregular warfare, while 
political support for continued deployment is waning in many missions, and enhanced PoC 
mandates are not always fully implemented (Sherman 2011). 
Taking a closer look, capability challenges that reflect the difficulties of an organization representing 
192 member states exist in the complex and variable support provided by troop-contributing 
countries and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs). Often with a clear dividing line between 
TCCs from the developing world and PCCs from the developed world, peacekeepers provided by 
member states often lack sufficient training or equipment. Lack of interoperability and standardized 
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doctrine present additional challenges. Member states often fail to fill the gaps in civilian and military 
requests by the UN for these missions. Additionally, UN peace operations’ effectiveness can be 
decreased by command relationships, bureaucratic systems of accountability, limited capability of the 
UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) as superior HQ, influence of interests by 
member states, difficult transfer of information within silo-like structures, and lack of coherent 
doctrine for fighting irregular war when necessary. Given the extraordinary growth in UN 
peacekeeping, and no reduction in need on the horizon, the ready stocks and funds to deploy 
missions have not been sufficiently adjusted. As is the case with NATO, member states have failed 
to provide the necessary additional capacity to reinforce missions during crises. Moreover, the UN 
still lacks sufficient capability to manage the massive peacekeeping tasks handed to it by the Security 
Council, with only 900 staff members in UNDPKO/DFS headquarters to manage this massive 
undertaking (Stodgers 2011). Other areas where progress is needed include the strengthening of 
linkages to peace building and mediation and improvement in the policy, financial, administrative, 
and logistics support required to successfully deploy the full range of international instruments 
addressing post conflict situations. 
Overall, however, there is a trend for more robust and proactive responses, and the UN is engaged 
in devising specific training for peacekeepers on PoC and its implementation. In the past decade, 
beginning with the Brahamini report in 2000, the UN responded to its shortcomings with reform 
initiatives elicited by the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and individual member states. These 
have included efforts to improve doctrine, planning, management, and oversight mechanisms for 
peacekeeping operations, as well as initiatives to expand the base of troops, police, and civilian 
peacekeepers and strengthen the capacity of those willing to contribute. (Sherman, 2011). Many of 
the recommendations have been implemented to various degrees. One notable example is the 2009 
“A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping.” This 
document set forth a plan to address the complex and evolving nature of demands placed on UN 
peacekeeping and its diverse military, police, and other civilian elements. Key proposals outlined in 
the document focus on the enhancement of peacekeeping partnerships, helping to “build common 
ground among those who participate in peacekeeping operations: those who contribute to 
peacekeeping with personnel, equipment, and financial resources; those who plan, manage, and 
execute operations; and those who partner with UN peacekeeping operations to deliver on the 
ground.” As one implementation example, since its publication, the DPKO has dramatically 
increased the number of consultative meetings with TCCs on the missions in which they are 
deployed.  
One area that has taken on greater importance is the role of police engaged in policing missions in 
all their forms and capacities, which is crucial for stabilizing fragile and conflict-torn states. Of 
special note are the efforts to develop baseline capability standards for the policing functions and to 
build on recent successful innovative experience with the Formed Police Unit. A comprehensive 
police doctrine has been developed to help define the roles, responsibilities, and appropriate tasks—
as well as expectations—of policing within a peacekeeping context. Discussions are underway on 
improving the current system for recruiting and deploying individual police for service in order to 
deliver high-quality personnel to missions quickly and efficiently (Durch, 2010). 
Recently, a senior advisory group appointed by the UN wrote an important document to the 
General Assembly on enhancing the work of the Security Council and the peace operations it 
deploys. Recognizing the unique role of the UN in dealing with the aftermath of conflict and that 
situations change quickly as a community moves from war to peace, the advisory group called for a 
more flexible system that will also be more efficient. Leaders in the field, who are closest to needs, 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 111
Elron 21st Century Peacekeeping and Future Warfare
 	  
must be able to draw on a menu of resources and capacities located within mission structures, the 
UN country team, and resources outside the UN in order to allocate resources based on 
comparative advantage. Whenever feasible, local capacities are recommended to be used. New ways 
of working include future missions that are leaner in terms of civilian staff and more flexible.  
The Group uses a framework it calls “OPEN,” which refers to four key principles—ownership, 
partnership, expertise, and nimbleness. These principles are aligned with already existing efforts to 
enhance peacekeeping and peace-building capabilities stated in previous documents, and much of its 
thinking could be reflected in numerous US documents, such as the Department of State’s 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and various counterinsurgency 
documents. For example, international assistance needs to be aligned with nationally identified needs 
and priorities, as well as identifying, protecting, nurturing, and supporting national capacities, core 
government functions, and national ownership. This includes ensuring a stronger role for women, 
whose active participation is essential for lasting peace. Specialist capacities outside the UN are 
crucial, and these niche skills can be found in UN Member States—in their governments, civil 
society, and private sectors.2 There needs to be an easy process to access these capacities at short 
notice in response to demand. Additional recommendations include strengthening the quality and 
scope of training for senior leaders, as well as an adoption of a results-based performance audit 
culture that seeks to enable and improve implementation, rather than just punish administrative non-
compliance. 
In what ways can the US engage in more significant ways to allow the UN as well as regional 
organizations like the AU to stand up to challenges in the next 15 years in conflict areas around the 
world? All trends suggested above could be assisted by US capabilities. The US has been a 
prominent actor in facilitating peace agreements; Security Council resolutions; reform to create a 
culture of economy, ethics, and excellence; and “budget discipline, transparency, internal ethics 
rewarding talent, and retiring underperformers” (Rice, 2011). The Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) program was initiated in 2004 and is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
account, which is managed by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in 
cooperation with the Department of Defense. Its aim is to address major gaps in international peace 
operations via “security assistance program[s] intended to enhance international capacity to 
effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace operations by building partner country 
capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies; increasing the number of capable military 
troops and formed police units (FPUs) available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, 
logistical support, and deployment of military units and FPUs to Peace Support Operations (PSOs).” 
While the program’s first five years focused on significantly increasing the number of trained and 
equipped peacekeepers available for deployment, current program emphasis will shift to building 
sustainable, self-sufficient, local peace operation training capabilities in targeted partner countries, 
particularly via the establishment and strengthening of partner countries’ training infrastructures. 
Additional activities include enhancing the capacity of regional/sub-regional organizations and 
institutions to train for, plan, deploy, manage, sustain, and obtain and integrate lessons learned from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Capability gaps exist especially in the areas of: (a) basic safety and security: disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration; police; and security sector reform and governance; (b) the area of justice: corrections; criminal justice; and 
judicial and legal reform;  (c) inclusive political processes: political party development; and public information; (d) core 
government functionality: aid coordination; legislative branch; and public financial management; (e) economic 
revitalization: employment generation; natural resource management; and private sector development. 
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PSOs; and supporting the continuation and enhancement of multilateral approaches and 
partnerships to coordinate PSO capacity-building efforts.3 
Yet more can be done to allow the peace operations to best address the conflicts they are embedded 
within. In a series of discussions between US and UN officials (Sodberg, 2011), participants pointed 
to areas in which the United States might be able to do more. These included providing support for 
intelligence, command and control, specific interoperability training, and regionally based centers of 
training; and better integrating the training of potential UN troop contributors into its own training 
efforts, perhaps through the combatant commands. Other recommendations included providing 
systems to better coordinate efforts by donors and strengthening an international peacekeeping 
coordination and support mechanism. Such a worldwide and systematic initiative could help the US 
identify countries with the capacity to be high-quality contributors. 
Other important areas of influence are increasing the number of US experts in peacekeeping 
frameworks and enhancing partnerships with TCCs that have the potential to contribute more 
troops. To fill gaps in needed expertise, especially for overcoming political sensitivities, the US can 
organize a cadre of experts who can work outside the UN on short- or long-term contracts, have 
acquired expertise in conflict zones like Iraq and Afghanistan, and possess the senior leadership 
training that is highly prevalent in the US public and private sectors. Such a cadre should include a 
strong presence of professional women who can work specifically in roles empowering women in 
the host countries. With its performance-oriented culture and high-quality education and military 
training systems, the US contribution can be invaluable and is well aligned with America’s currently 
high unemployment rates. With drawback from Afghanistan and Iraq, more officers can be deployed 
in key positions, such as logistics. Deployment of police is perhaps another crucial way to enhance 
the quality of peace operations. Seven US federal agencies collectively spend billions of dollars 
annually on training and equipping police in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia, and 
elsewhere abroad in order to enable local police to better deal with terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
and crime.  This assistance could be extended directly to UN missions by actual deployment, either 
for the purpose of training or for actively engaging in policing activities with the local population.  
To be able to target assistance more accurately, knowledge of trends of TCC deployment needs to 
be mapped accurately. In a recent study, global capacity has been compartmentalized into two 
groups—the UN and CWA clusters—that accounted for 85 to 90 percent of all contributions from 
2001-08 (Daniels, 2011). There is little overlap between them, with the CWA mostly including 
troops from the US and Europe, one consequence being that the UN group does not have many 
contributors with highly resourced forces, while the CWAC group that could provide those forces is 
so strained quantitatively that it must make major trans-regional shifts to meet its needs beneath a 
ceiling of about 75,000. The study’s finding support the initial statement of this paper—that two 
parallel worlds exist, and that they complement each other in tasks—yet have the capacity to 
cooperate in a number of ways, on the ground and beyond. 
With the withdrawal of US troops there could be a change in the strict boundaries between the two 
groups, and while the US has been reluctant to serve under UN command, the recent flexibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The support provided by GPOI by the end of 2010 was active in 58 selected countries around the world, especially in 
Africa and South America. Over 120,500 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers have been trained, and GPOI 
has facilitated the deployment of over 110,500 personnel from 29 countries to 19 operations around the world. In 
addition, GPOI has directly or indirectly supported the training of over 3,500 police trainers from 49 countries at the 
Italian-run Center of Excellen-ce for Stability Police Units in Vicenza,Italy.  
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command and control  (the re-integration of European into UNIFIL is one example) can perhaps 
allow a partial reintegration into peacekeeping. With worldwide changes in militaries, an added 
advantage for the US is finding new partners with whom to operate in its own missions, those done 
in the NATO framework, or help the UN recruit more troops. Daniels (2011) suggests several 
indicators to look for and discusses the proposal that the US lead and set up an effort to link states 
together to fill a critical capability gap: the formation of quickly deployable, mission-planning and 
headquarters battalions, ideally at least two Standing High Readiness Battalions (SHIRBATs) that 




The international community’s response to armed conflict may be more promising than is generally 
believed. The global system is increasingly policed by its multilateral institutions—indeed one of the 
principal ideas behind the founding of the UN. The US may be forced into this position by its own 
strategic, budgetary, and political circumstance as well as the changing circumstances of the global 
order and strength of other states. There is evidence to suggest that the UN may be slowly but surely 
filling the vacuum left by the US, as it has been doing for years, perhaps presenting a promise that 
the global system will not break down after all. Moreover, the UN’s multiple capabilities—from a 
global and sound health organization, refugee sheltering capabilities, humanitarian assistance, and 
development agencies, and expertise in transitioning countries to democratic governance—afford 
leverage and legitimacy that go beyond what the US alone can offer.   
For shorter-term action with long-term effects, as well as from a legitimacy point of view, the UN is 
the global responder of choice. From an effectiveness perspective, its strength lies in responding to 
the immediate aftermath of conflict rather than being an actor in the conflict, preventing a 
recurrence of the devastation, and helping civilians get their lives back into new order with the aid of 
multidimensional peacekeeping. The other part—effectively enforcing a stop to the devastation in 
the first place—is almost exclusively reserved for non-UN operations that, more often than not, are 
the province of a cluster of states and of one idiosyncratic actor, e.g., as in Afghanistan and Timor-
Leste. 
The two parts constitute a whole when the UN and non-UN operations occur in sequence or in 
parallel, the result being a division of labor that, at the end of the day, is a net plus for civilian 
protection (Daniels, 2011). Despite European military decline, NATO is still the only organization 
that can currently take on the peace enforcement portion.4 The US needs to watch closely Asian 
alliances as potential regional contributors to peacekeeping, keeping note that Asia, “with its 
dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago” (Haas, 2011). 
In African conflicts, the AU is getting more prominent in its involvement in peace operations. Here, 
enhanced training and equipment assistance from the US as well as NATO will continue to be 
needed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As a warning note however, the Defense Secretary indicated he is “worried openly about NATO turning into a two-
tiered alliance:  Between members who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, 
and those conducting the “hard” combat missions.  Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens 
of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or 
headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.  This is no longer a hypothetical worry.  We are 
there today. And it is unacceptable.” With the UN, currently there are no participants with a taste for the hard combat 
missions. 
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For the US, this means, in the words of its ambassador to the UN, that “We are far better off 
working to strengthen the UN than trying to starve it—and then having to choose between filling 
the void ourselves or leaving real threats untended… yet we need to continue to lead the charge for 
serious and comprehensive reform.” No less important is that the US needs to venture beyond its 
educating and training role, and be able to learn best practices from its partners around the world in 
how to conduct multidimensional operations in post-conflict areas. The UN and its TCCs have 
gathered invaluable experience throughout the last decade that too often sits below the radar for 
deployed US units and personnel as well as policymakers.  With so many uncertainties around future 
warfare and responses to it, multilateral cooperation, capabilities, and reforms in the world of 
peacekeeping and international security will unfold in ways that will profoundly affect the world’s 
ability to address organized violence in inter and intra-state disputes. 
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